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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DONALD 0. MARTINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16345

THE INDUSTRIAL C0~1ISSION
OF UTAH, W-M INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., and STATE
INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an application by plaintiff Donald 0. Martinson to
determine his entitlement to workmen's compensation benefits
arising out of a November 21, 1976 motor vehicular collision.
DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
After a hearing on liability only, Honorable Keith E. Sohrn,
Administrative Law Judge, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order denying plaintiff's entitlement and dismissing
his petition.

(R. 199-206). Thereafter, the Commission denied

plaintiff's Motion for Review.

(R. 209-10).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff Martinson seeks reversal of the Administrative
Law Judge's Order and the Commission's denial, and direction of
an Order establishing his entitlement to such workmen's compensation benefits as are established following review by a medical
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

panel.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A summary of undisputed facts follows:
At all times here pertinent, Martinson--in the liability insurance business since 194 9--was a vice president, director and employee, paid on a commission basis, of W-M Insurance
Agency, Inc., Salt Lake City.

He earned $48,173.20 in 1976.

~

was primarily engaged in production, for which he received 60%-and W-M 40%--of commissions upon premiums generated and renewed.
(R. 2, 19-20, 26,30).
W-M asked Martinson to spend mornings in the office to
attend to details on his accounts.

Afternoons, he generally was

out calling an old business and creating new.

Also, he occasion·

ally worked on business accounts on weekends.

Himself a residen:

of Salt Lake City, Martinson had no territorial limits on insurance solicitation; and, in fact had a customer as far away as
Mesa, Arizona.

(R. 19-21).

One such customer--for which Martinson made his sole
out-of-town trip in November, 1976--was Kimball Art Center, Park
City.

An unsalaried Center sponsor and director was Bob Hilliaro:

President of Arthur G. Rubin and Company, a Los Angeles insuranc<
agency.

Martinson during 1966-69 had worked for Williams and was

a friend, so the latter, who placed the Center insurance, did so
with W-M through Martinson, resulting, of course, in the standar:
40%-60% premium split.

(R. 20-22, 41-42, 46, 63).

The policy issued was a Fireman's Fund M X P or portfolio policy.

It covered both the Center's construction phase

and the art exhibition thereafter.

(R. 20-21A, 60).

The Center's opening for exhibition occurred on Satu~
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November 20, 1976.

For the event, a large number of art ob-

jects--such as paintings, sculptures and crafts--had been assembled on the site.

(R. 21).

Earlier in the week, Williams had called Martinson from
Los Angeles and requested the latter to come to Park City to make
a complete inspection of the display in order to assure that the
insurance coverage was adequate.

Also, he invited Martinson on

the 20th to be an overnight guest of his wife and him at his Park
City condominium.
19th.

The Williams arrived in Park City the 18th or

20-211 241 411 51-52) •

(R.

Although Martinson does not pretend to appraise art
values, it is usual for an agent personally to examine large displays at insured museums.

(R. 41, 49, 51).

W-M's president was

aware of Martinsou's trip to Park City for that purpose, did not
object, and--in Martinson's characterization--"if I had said I
wasn't going, he would have gone right through the ceiling."
(R.

38-39).
On the 20th, Martinson drove to Park City alone, taking

his Kimball Art Center insurance file, a change of clothes and a
kit to stay the night.

(R. 41, 51-52).

He arrived in Park City

between noon and two p.m., and met Williams.

(R. 21A).

They

looked over the Center items, which involved getting a final list
of everything that had come in from all over the country before
display.

(R. 21).

Although the staff had recorded almost, but

not everything, such records had not previously been communicated
to Martinson.

Also the manager was busy, because of the many

persons in attendance.

(R. 40).

Therefore, the compilation was
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the 20th, and likely the 21st.

(R. 22-23).

On the 21st, the

two went over the records from late in the morning until 4:30 or
4:45p.m., at which time they reconciled a $55,000 insurance
shortage.

(R.

24).

On Sunday, the 21st, Williams further gave Martinson a
lead on possible Utah insurance business with National Lead.
(R. 47-48).

After he returned to work following the collision,

Martinson pursued, without avail, that lead.

(R. 53-54) .

The $55,000 deficiency having been confirmed, Martinson
called from Williams' condominium to Donald 0. Hurst at the latter's Salt Lake residence.

Hurst was resident vice president and

manager of Firemen's Fund (which had issued the M X P or portfolio policy).

They arranged for a binder for the $55,000 addition·

al coverage, effective as of (if not before) the call.
a premium for such additional coverage.

W-M earnec

(R. 24-25, 39-40, 52, 51,

61-62).
Business completed, Martinson left the Williams' condominium at 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. to drive back to Salt Lake.

(R. 26).

As he approached the Parley's Summit incline, he was driving his
car at a speed of 60 to 70 mph, slowing to 50 to 60 mph at the
crest of the incline.
clear.

It was going into dusk.

The road was dry.

There was no traffic.

The weather was
(R. 31-32).

As Martinson traversed the crest, he saw directly aheac
of him--30 to 60 seconds distant--a truck in his lane, going roue:
more slowly than he.

He did not know how stable his automobile

would be were he to execute a quick turn; he feared he would roL
He determined it would be safer to go into the back of the truci
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the

investigating officer was of the opinion he did not.

(R. 26, 32).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Martinson's blood sample, taken at 8:36p.m., November
21, contained .18% alcohol by weight.

(R. 7, 63-64, 177-78).

Martinson and Williams had consumed spirituous beverage during
their afternoon conference, but Martinson cannot recall the
quantity although he characterized it as "social drinking," and
"over a long period of time."

(R. 53, 55, 69).

He had nothing

to drink after leaving Williams and until the collision.
(R. 69-70).
The principals did not consider Martinson to be alcoholically impaired as he left to come home.

Hurst, who has

known Martinson socially for 40 years and who has seen him drink,
said, "I had no idea that he had had a drink, or was partying.
As far as I was concerned, he was calling on business, and I
knew that he was attending the opening of that Kimball Art Center."
(R. 62).

Martinson himself had "a very clear recollection of

leaving the condominium, driving down the freeway, and noticing
that it was a beautiful day.

I didn't feel like I was drunk, or

that I couldn't handle a car."

(R. 55).

fact, told Martinson, "'Had we thought,'
wife)

Williams, after the
(that is he and his

'that you were too intoxicated to drive, we would have

asked you to stay over.'"

(R. 33).

In the course of his business, approximately 30% of
Martinson's customer and potential customer contacts involve
drinking to varying degrees.

(R. 57, 70).

W-M Insurance had

no hard and fast rules about tippling while producing.

Martinson
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would abstain at lunch.

The employee agreed.

It was pointed

out that such drinking was something that was inhibiting his
work.

(R. 35-36).

Previously, Martinson had counseled with a

physician regarding a depressive reaction to imbibing.
received no prior drunk driving citations.

He had

(R. 34-35).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
As a result of the collision, Martinson suffered exten·
sive injuries, missed a great deal of work, has undergone repea·
ted and prolonged hospital and outpatient treatment, and has
incurred extensive obligations.

(R. 5-6, 8-10, 27-30, 71-176),

As previously noted, no medical panel evaluation was had before
the Commission.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ABSENT INTOXICATION, PLAINTIFF'S COLLISION AROSE OUT OF OR IN Tffi
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
Clearly Martinson's .18% blood alcohol count, as well
as the drinking activity productive thereof, was central to the
Administrative Law Judge's rationale and decision--both of which
were adopted, without comment, by the Commission.

The imbibing

is mentioned, usually in multiples, on no less than four of the
five full pages of the Findings, Conclusions and Order.
202-04).

(R.

20~

It is a fair conclusion that--had everything else beer

exactly as it was, but non-alcoholic instead of spirituous bever
ages consumed--Martinson would have been held entitled to comper·
sation.
The undisputed facts dictate such a result.
First, the nature of the trip.

Plaintiff was a valus·
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Martinson's production, was 40% of commissions he generated, or
$32,115.47

(Martinson's 60% being $48,173.20).
Far from being tied to a desk or to explicit instruc-

tions, Martinson's sales activities took him from the office on
afternoons and occasionally on weekends.

They took him as far

away as Mesa, Arizona.
So, it was both natural and proper, when a preexisting
policy holder--Williams for Kimball Art Center--asked him to come
to Park City to inspect and inventory exhibits in order to update
the coverage under that very policy, that Martinson would do so.
Not only had Martinson and W-M reaped financial returns from the
original policy; they would do so again directly from any increase in coverage, and indirectly from the good will attendant
to assiduous servicing of insurance accounts.
Therefore, while W-M may not explicitly have directed
Martinson's trip, W-M naturally did not object thereto, and
"would have gone right through the ceiling" had Martinson refused
to go.
Second, the necessity of the trip.

Martinson's Park

City activities produced a binder, effective November 21 for the
$55,000 additional Center exhibits.
The Administrative Law Judge is confused as to the
nature of an insurance binder.

He recites that, when Martinson

called the Fireman Fund's Hurst, he "asked for additional coverage."

(R. 200, emphasis supplied).
To the contrary, Martinson obtained additional coverage,

effective immediately.
as

Said Hurst, "Well the binder was placed
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The fact that the binder was oral gives rise to no
distinction.

Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth Edition), p. 213

defines the term:
BINDER. The memorandum of an agreement for
insurance, intended to give temporary protection pending investigation of the risk
and issuance of a formal policy.
Seiderman
v. Herman Perla Inc., 268 N.Y. 188, 197 N.E.
190, 191.
A verbal contract of insurance in praesenti,
of which the insurance agent makes a memorandum, temporary in its nature, Norwich Union
Fire Ins. Society v. Dalton, Tex. Civ.App.,
175 s.w. 459, 460; thus constituting a short
method of issuing a temporary policy to continue until execution of the formal one,
Sherri v. National Surety Co., 243 N.Y. 266,
153 N.E. 70, 71. Carew, Shaw & Bernasconi v.
General Casualty Co. of America, 189 Wash.
329, 65 P.2d 689, 695.
Assume, for a moment, that Martinson had not gone to
Park City, that he and Williams had not assembled, inspected and
compiled records, and that a binder in consequence had not been
placed.

Assume, further, that a casualty had destroyed the addi·

tional $55,000 in art objects on the night of November 21-22.

Ir.

that event, Kimball Art Center would have absorbed the additional
loss and W-M most likely would have lost a customer alienated by
the inattentiveness of W-M's services.
Likewise, it was a business necessity for Martinson tc
work on the 21st, for all records were not available until then.
It follows that Martinson's Park City activities were
compelled by business considerations, authorized in the characte:
of insurance enterprises, and distinctly necessary.

In every

way, they met the test of Ford Motor Company v. Industrial C~
sion, 64 Utah 425, 231 Pac 432 (1924).

Martinson's promotion o:

W-M'
s by
business
was
not
remote.
It was
and and
directly
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tated W-M's financial interests.
POINT II
UNDER THE UTAH STATUTE, INTOXICATION REDUCES, BUT DOES NOT ELIMINATE, COMPENSATION.
Workmen's Compensation laws vary from state to state.
In consequence, the impact of intoxication in one jurisdiction
can be quite different than that in another, 81 Am. Jur. 2d,
Workmen's Compensation Sec. 234, pp. 886-87.
Effective July 1, 1921, the Utah result of intoxication has been governed by Laws of Utah 1921, Chap. 67.

As now

codified 35-1-14, UCA 1953, it reads:
Penalty for failure to use safety device.-Where injury is caused by the willful failure
of the employee to use safety devices where
provided by the employer, or from the employee's willful failure to obey any order or
reasonable rule adopted by the employer for
the safety of the employee, or from the intoxication of the employee, compensation provided
for herein shall be reduced fifteen per cent,
except in case of injury resulting in death.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The legislature having so mandated, decisions from
states without a comparable statute are more misleading than
helpful.

Conversely, those from jurisdictions which have adop-

ted a similar scheme have great persuasive weight.

Two such

entities are Wisconsin (15% reduction) and Colorado (50% reduction).
In Gimbel Bros. v. Industrial Commission, 229 Wis.
296, 282 N.W. 78

(1938), a delivery truck driver dropped off

merchandise at a customer's tavern.

He then partook of the

tavern's alcoholic liquid wares until he became staggering, vomiting drunk.

Nonetheless, the driver continued his deliveries
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and, while so occupied, lost control of the truck, and collided
with a lamp post.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court held the facts

did not preclude an 85% recovery.

It said at 282 N.W. 80:

If it had been the intention of
the legislature to penalize employees
who violated any law either willfully
or otherwise while in the course of
their employment, they would have so
provided. As the Compensation Act now
provides, the only penalty visited on
employees where injury results from
their intoxication is a reduction of
15% from the amount they would otherwise
be entitled to.
In Electric Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Connnis·
sion, 154 Colo. 491, 391 P.2d 677

(1964), a General Electric Com·

pany technician was in a one-car accident returning from an outof-town trip.

He had a .195% alcohol blood level.

The Colorado

Supreme Court held the facts did not preclude a 50% recovery.

Iti
I

said at 391 P2d 679:
The only effect that intoxication could
have in this case would be to reduce his
benefits by 50%; it had nothing to do with
the question as to whether the employee sustained injuries arising out of and in the
course of his employment.
Undoubtedly the evidence justified a finding that--at
the time of his accident--Martinson was intoxicated.

His .18%

blood alcohol level was .08% higher than the criminal level,
41-6-44.2 UCA 1953.

It was .10% higher than the present--and

• 03% higher than the pre-1967--presumptive level, 41-6-44, 1953.
Therefore--although there was contrary evidence--the fact finder's determination of drunkenness cannot here be attacked.
What can, and should be, assaulted is the Administrative Law Judge's and the Commission's cavalier disregard of
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Although cited to both (R. 195, 211), neither dealt

with it.

Here, it is controlling.
Morley v. Industrial Commission, 23 U.2d 212, 459 P2d

212 (1969), cited by the Administrative Law Judge, is not--nor
does it pretend to be--a 35-1-14 decision.

In that matter, un-

like this, facts in contravention of the claimant's recital both
were elicited and compelling.

There, unlike here, the facts dem-

onstrated an all-inclusive private purpose.
At one point, the Administrative Law Judge opined,
"We can easily infer that his (Martinson's) boss did not encourage him to drink with his clientel but would and probably did
discourage said actions."
total evidence.

The inference is at odds with the

(R. 35-36, 57, 70).

But--even if the inference

is accepted--it would constitute nothing more than a "reasonable
rule for the safety of the employee," which also is specified by
35-1-14 and which could be no more than a ground additional to
intoxication for a 15% reduction.
The Legislature, not the Commission, draws Utah's
Workmen's Compensation policy.

The Commission cannot properly

ignor the mandate of 35-1-14.
CONCLUSION
The trip from which Martinson was returning at the
time of his collision was a necessary business one.

A finding

of intoxication will reduce, but not preclude, compensation.
The case should be remanded to the Commission for reference to a
medical panel, and for such further proceedings as are appropriate.
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Respectfully submitted,

Kefit

nearer

'

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Martinson
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M. David Eckersley, Esq.
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